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‘Organized crime in Asia: a review of problems and progress’ 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a preliminary overview of research on organized crime in 
Asia drawing on selected papers from the symposium held at the National 
University of Singapore in June 2007. We draw on these contributions to 
emphasize the enterprise nature of organized crime and the common problems 
encountered by law enforcement in controlling and preventing the many harms 
inflicted by serious criminal activity.  Recent attempts to address the changing 
character and forms of transnational organized crime, especially through the 
strengthening of mutual legal assistance by regional bodies such as ASEAN are 
noted. These measures have yet to develop into the cross-border institutional 
frameworks now found in Europe and the level of effective co-operation can only 
continue to improve.  Countering organized crime in Asia also face additional 
difficulties arising from the cultural diversity, relative weakness of law 
enforcement in some states and the lack of common strategies in respect to illicit 
markets.  
 
 
Key words: organized crime, ASEAN, yakuza, triad, illicit markets, comparative 
criminology
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Introduction 
Historically organized crime has generated a mixture of fear, fascination and 
concern, and this remains no less the case today. In response to the extra-ordinary 
stimulus of twenty-first century global trade and the rapid development of 
information communication technology (ICT), criminal enterprises and ‘gangs’ 
have evolved in complex and novel ways. The structural forms and modus 
operandi of organized crime, serious criminal networks and syndicates keep 
changing as they capitalize on the opportunities provided by diverse socio-
economic, political and global conditions. Nevertheless, their materialist goals and 
deadly behaviour remain constant. These changing conditions, especially the 
cross-border context of criminal enterprises, contribute to the difficulties faced by 
modern law enforcement agencies in effectively countering the corrosive impact 
of organized crime.  
 
Despite a plethora of mainly United States (US) studies about organized crime 
since the 1950s, controversies remain regarding its definition, structure, functions, 
and how best to control it (Levi 2002). This controversy is reflected in the articles 
in this special issue and in the very interchangeability of the terms used to describe 
organized crime.  Sensationalism, myths and misinformation created in part by its 
inherent secrecy have made the investigation of organized crime a topic much 
abused in the both popular and academic literature. Further, the rapid forces of 
globalization and their socio-political and economic impact  have provided the 
impetus to reconceptualize our understanding of the dynamics of organized crime 
not only as a domestic social problem but as a ‘transnational’ social force and 
global threat.   
 
In part, this quickening of interest in transnational forms of organized crime has 
also been connected to the increased concern about the potential interactions with 
terrorism since 9/11 as well as risks posed by ‘failed’ states and ‘new wars’ (Jung 
2005). Multi-lateral responses to law enforcement have become increasingly 
important in order to improve the effectiveness of mutual legal assistance to 
address both longstanding (e.g. narcotics trafficking) and newer problems (e.g. 
cybercrime) of cross-border crime. Like the European Union (EU) and Council of 
Europe (CoE), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN1), has sought 
to co-ordinate the response to non-traditional security concerns such as organized 
crime. However, it is yet to develop joint institutional mechanisms such as the 
EU’s EUROPOL. There is a also a lack of concrete programs in respect to 
maritime piracy, illegal drugs and counter-terrorism and pressing competing 
concerns about other human security issues such as avian influenza (ASEAN 
                                                 
1 China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, the US and the EU have observer status at ASEAN and 
indeed ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, Republic of Korea) has a significant role to play in co-operation against 
transnational crime. Also notable is the central Asian countries that participate in the Shanghai 5 (now 10) 
grouping which includes the Russian Federation, China and India. 
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Secretariat 2006a). However, the growing importance of ASEAN plus three, and 
the continued and more frequent dialogue on crime are significant improvements 
and show the overlap between increased trade and cross-border crime. The 
appointment of police liaison officers to consular posts, 24/7 hotlines for senior 
designated officers and the sharing of criminal intelligence are no longer novel 
developments. Kleemans (2008) notes in the introduction to the special issue of 
the European Journal of Criminology (Volume 5) ‘Organized Crime, Terrorism 
and European Criminology’, developments in organized crime policy within 
Europe (with the notable exception of Italy), are relatively recent.  
 
ASEAN and the broader Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) have since 
the mid-1990s begun to establish multi-lateral measures to improve the law 
enforcement co-operation of member states. In respect to ASEAN the 1997 and 
1998 Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime; 
the 1999 Yangon Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime and, the 2004 
Vientiane Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and 
Children provide for dialogue and joint action.  In addition ASEAN in 2004 has 
also entered into co-operative arrangements with China to: 
 
“…develop practical strategies in accordance with their national laws and 
regulations to enhance the capacity of each individual country and the 
region as a whole in dealing with such non-traditional security issues as 
trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in 
woman and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money 
laundering, international economic crime and cybercrime”2.  
 
These efforts are co-ordinated through the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) supported by meetings of the relevant 
senior officials (SOMTC) who are tasked with developing five-year plans and co-
ordination with other ASEAN senior officials responsible for “drug matters”, and 
the meetings of ASEANAPOL (Chiefs of National Police) and heads of customs 
and immigration. Such transnational cooperation and the role of agencies such as 
Interpol and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Prevention are 
important since they help create the necessary climate to bring about a universal 
jurisdiction for many serious crimes. An important recent example is the United 
Nations (UN) Transnational Organized Crime Convention adopted in 2000 and 
ratified in September 2003 by 135 countries including China, Japan and most 
other Asian countries. Additional protocols addressing human smuggling3 have 
also been rapidly adopted, but the protocol dealing with firearms smuggling has 
                                                 
2 Article 1 of the “MOU Between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the 
Field of Non-Traditional Issues”, Bangkok, Thailand, January 10, 2004. 
3 ASEAN has also undertaken to develop a regional convention on trafficking in persons. 
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been ratified by fewer countries in the region. 
 
According to the UN, international drug trafficking alone is estimated to generate 
US$500 billion per year, whilst counterfeiting goods reaps some US$60 billion, 
costing legitimate businesses around US$200 billion.  The new growth industry of 
credit card fraud annually extracts close to US$15 billion from a gross bank 
volume of US $10 trillion, and reported losses due to maritime fraud are estimated 
at US$13 billion per annum.  Four million human beings, including women and 
children, are trafficked around the world each year earning crime syndicates US$7 
billion per annum, and so the list goes on. The exceptional growth of these 
phenomena, paradoxically, accompanied the growth of legitimate international 
businesses, with crime syndicates using many of the mechanisms that allow for 
increased trade to further their illegitimate aims (Shaw, van Dijk, and Rhomberg, 
2003).  
 
Aims and rationale  
The articles which appear in this special issue (i.e. Part II and most of those 
published in 2007 in Part I; Volume 2 [2]) are derived from selected and revised 
papers from the proceedings4 of the ‘Organized Crime in Asia: Governance and 
Accountability’ symposium held at the National University of Singapore in June 
20075.  With a focus on Asia, and the Asian diaspora it brought together domain 
experts and leading international and regional researchers to address current issues 
in organized crime. The conveners also sought papers that also addressed state-
sponsored criminality, political corruption, accountability and governance, 
transnational policing, international law, and terrorism.  Due to constraints of time 
and treasure the scope of the essays presented in this and the preceding issue are  
limited: fewer national accounts are presented than desired and some interesting 
papers did not evolve from conference to publication.  What is offered is a 
tentative reconnoiter – a brief survey of the progress and problems in 
understanding organized crime in Asia. 
 
The region has perhaps an unjustified notoriety for organized crime because of the 
long-standing reputation of the triads (of Hong Kong) and boryokudan or yakuza 
(Japan) which have been the subject of much media attention and romanticism.  
The geographical proximity of the Golden Triangle and the role of the heroin trade 
in stimulating the growth of criminal networks have also played a key role; Ko-lin 
Chin’s novel and intriguing discussion of the problems of researching in the 
                                                 
4 Broadhurst, R. and N. Ganapathy eds., 2007, Organised Crime in Asia: Governance and Accountability,  
Symposium Proceedings – June 2007, National University of Singapore/Queensland University of 
Technology, QUT Printing Services, Brisbane (ISBN: 978-1-74107-203-7). 
5 The symposium was jointly funded by the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore 
and the School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology with the assistance from a number of 
government and commercial sponsors. 
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contested Wa ‘state’ exemplifies this.   However, in the last decade the problem is 
now underlined by the phenomenal growth of Asia’s economies which has had led 
to new and emerging forms of organized crime with characteristics peculiar to the 
region. Economically and politically, the region is dynamic and diverse and can be 
viewed as providing varied examples of social transition - from relative poverty to 
national wealth, from command to market economies, from conflict to 
reconstruction and, last but not least, from relative isolation to globalization. The 
blurring between legitimate market economies and illicit criminal activities offers 
a wide range of political, social and cultural contexts for the proliferation of 
organized crime. This special issue is intended to serve as a useful platform to 
examine existing conceptual models and rethink empirical inquiries in an effort to 
better understand organized crime in the region which, hitherto, have been 
predominantly dictated and determined by Anglo-Saxon perspectives. Thus an 
important motivation for both contributors and readers alike of this special issue is 
to not only promote intellectual exchange between scholars from ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the region but also to develop regional alternatives, perspectives which 
are faithful to and arise from empirical investigation into the phenomenon of 
organized crime in Asia.  
 
Problems of method and evidence 
The investigation into the nature, scale and seriousness of organized crime, 
however, is thwarted by methodological, political and ideological considerations 
(Cressey 1967; Kleemans 2008; Maltz 1976; Levi 2002).  Organized criminal 
groups operate in conditions of relative secrecy and hostility, and access to reliable 
informants is rare. In addition, organized criminals often have associations with 
powerful and respectable social actors in legitimate society which enable criminal 
groups to shield their illicit activities from law enforcement. Knowledge about 
organized crime often draws on journalistic sources which may seek to 
sensationalize and decontextualize the phenomenon and often compromises 
accurate reporting, and combined with the lack of access to official data collected 
by government bodies or the selective censorship of such data provide, at best, an 
incomplete and distorted picture of organized crime (Cressey 1967; Block 1978; 
Nelli 1976; Schatzberg 1993; Calder 1992; Potter 1994; Salerno and Tompkins 
1969).  Scholars of organized crime recognize the lack of independent academic 
research on this topic because of an ‘over-reliance’ on official sources or the 
absence of any hard evidence. In addition there can be great difficulties in 
obtaining approval for meaningful research from university research ethics 
committees and funding agencies concerned about risk. Due to these access 
problems many academics have refrained from empirical research and entered into 
purely normative and ideological discussions, for example about the need to 
balance the privacy of suspects and the rights of the defence against oppressive 
policing techniques in order to secure successful investigation and prosecution 
(Fijnaut and Paoli 2004; Fyfe and Sheptycki 2006).   
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For want of a credible and first-hand account of organized crime (Reuter 1994: 91) 
Ko-lin Chin, in the introductory article of this issue, reflects on his experiences of 
having to improvise an “integrated research method” to study the drug trade in the 
Golden Triangle. This methodological approach comprised both traditional and 
“extreme research methods” where the latter “…involved either highly unusual or 
creative approaches to finding answers to difficult-to-answer questions” (Miller 
and Tewksbury, 2001: 1). The ‘extreme’ part of Chin’s approach centered on how 
he gained access to the research setting through clandestine means.  The research 
process, he admits, was frustrating because nothing was predictable, and whatever 
he took for granted as a researcher in the United States was almost unthinkably 
difficult in other research locations. Nevertheless, his ability to speak Burmese and 
his familiarity with Burmese culture, coupled with personal qualities of patience 
and the social capacity to network were instrumental to gaining an in-depth 
knowledge of the social organization of the drug trade in the Golden triangle.  
Chin’s study on the drug trade in the Golden Triangle included more than five 
hundred formal and informal interviews with a diverse group of interviewees 
conducted with the aid of able local assistants guided also by a standardized 
questionnaire to collect quantitative data. Chin’s approach exemplifies the 
adoption of a rigorous methodology which could also facilitate research not only 
on the organisation of the drug trade in other areas such as Afghanistan and 
Colombia but also organized crime in general. 
  
The problem of methodology and the reliability of official statistics, 
categorization, recording and their variability across jurisdictions are again 
highlighted in the article by Mohd Kassim Noor Mohamed but in relation to the 
phenomenon of kidnapping for ransom in the Asian region. Although kidnapping 
has long been used as a valuable tool in the organized crime armoury, either to 
generate financial profits or as a weapon in battles against rival groups (Newman 
2002), it is not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy what percentage 
could actually be attributed to organized crime. Mohd Kassim Noor Mohamed 
also notes that the incompatibility between kidnapping statistics produced by the 
criminal justice agencies and state departments of ASEAN member countries 
currently renders any meaningful comparison at the state and regional level 
impossible and makes international cooperation problematic. Typical distinctions 
between economic and politically motivated kidnappings also may not be helpful 
(Tzanelli 2006). To address this ‘gap’ in knowledge, the author proposes the 
development of a heuristic tool that can be adopted internationally to assist with 
crime recording and comparative statistical research  pertaining to kidnapping for 
ransom.   
 
Despite regional efforts to standardize crime counting mechanisms, including 
kidnap for ransom, there exist two important obstacles to harmonization of 
 8
statistics (see for example the ASEAN Heads of Statistical Offices Meeting in 
2006: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006b).  First, the region contains many different legal, 
linguistic, cultural and religious traditions, and even if a comprehensive crime-
recording standard could be devised in the English language, it might not be 
translatable throughout the region and a different conceptual system might provide 
a better starting point.  Second, in considering the definition of an international 
crime syndicate, the issue becomes more complicated and begs the question of 
who should count the offence: (a) the country of origin of the majority of victims 
or perpetrators; (b) a supranational agency, because the crime is committed in 
international territory, or (e) according to some other formula taking into account 
political, ideological and cultural sensitivities. According to Mohd Kassim Noor 
Mohamed, these problems do not only apply to the crime type of kidnapping for 
ransom, but also holds important implications for the definition, categorization and 
counting of other serious crimes committed by transnational organized crime 
groups in the region. 
 
Comparative Issues 
Sheptycki (this issue) begins his analysis of the relationship between Asian 
organized crime, orientalism and transnationalism by posing a rhetorical question 
about whether western criminologists are equipped to theorize about Asian 
organized crime (AOC). This presupposes in part that AOC is different from 
western or say Italian organized crime rather than merely a geo-political aspect of 
universal phenomena as suggested by the conveners. He argues that this is an 
important starting point for any scholar either from 'outside' and 'inside' the region. 
For Sheptycki the very notion of AOC raises complex questions, and offers a 
crucial test for positioning criminological theory between the universalism of 
human rights and the particularism of cultural relativism. The desire to empirically 
chart the transnational and comparative criminological field ought to be 
normatively grounded in a concern for human rights and the general 
commonwealth. Elsewhere, the author has tried to argue that transnational and 
comparative criminologists should employ a methodology that simultaneously 
blends a variety of social scientific methods together with a variety of theoretical 
perspectives in order to achieve reasonably rigorous ‘second best’ accounts of 
crime phenomena (Sheptycki 2000, 2005). Yet, paradoxically, under conditions of 
transnationalization, comparative criminology begins to refract because it becomes 
extremely difficult for ‘national cultures’ to remain pristine as if in splendid 
isolation: the cultural differences that remain are diffuse and finely intermingled 
and also tend to be spread transnationally. This has resulted in a shift in the 
criminological agenda as there is no longer the presumed natural affinity between 
criminological knowledge and the nation-state. In this sense comparative 
criminology perhaps is better understood as the criminology of the governance of 
new spaces emerging beyond the state and involving more often non-state actors 
(see for example Edwards and Hughes 2005). Despite the 'erosion' of comparative 
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criminology, Sheptycki observes that transnationalization has somewhat extended 
the criminological horizon with the advent of ‘green criminology’ which has put 
crimes against the environment, environmental harm and environmental justice on 
the agenda. In reference to organized crime in Asia, Sheptycki underlines the 
importance of considering its political context.  Studies of crime and crime control 
in Asia reveal that organized crime throughout the region thrives in the interstices 
of power that exist in the 'grey' area between licit and illicit markets where 
gangsters and state authorities in effect compete over market share in the provision 
of ‘protection’ and ‘regulation’ of illicit economic activity. In the circumstances of 
‘fragile’ states the protection offered by law-enforcement or other agencies over-
supplied with violent entrepreneurs creates its own demands and protection may 
advance to plunder (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2002) 
 
In a useful example of the difficulties and rewards of a comparative criminological 
focus, Henry Pontell and Gilbert Geis investigate the phenomenon of economic 
crime in the US and Japan. Recognizing the problems of conducting transnational 
research Pontell and Geis chart important benefits arising from such an 
investigation. They identified three problems: first, the ability of the foreign 
scholar to truly comprehend the social and linguistic nuances of a different culture 
in undertaking cross-cultural inquiries; second, in appreciating the relativity of the 
concept of crime in time and space; and third, in recognizing the disjuncture 
between law in books and law in (in)action. Fundamentally, they argue that 
comparative work can be used to unravel differences and similarities in legal 
culture and ideology, statutory laws, enforcement patterns, legal procedures, court 
structures, and punishment systems. This sense of sameness and difference is the 
contexts for understanding crime and law generally and in different societies.  In 
the current research, Pontell and Geis attempt to comprehend the reasons for the 
strikingly low rate of common crime in Japan as a starting point for inquiry into 
similarities and distinctions in regard to white-collar crime in the US and Japan. 
They, echo Miyazawa's assertion that,  
 
 "….with an apparently contradictory combination of tremendous 
economic development and consistently low crime rate, lower than those in 
most other developed countries, Japan has become an enigma for 
criminologists... [and]  an ideal testing ground for any approach in 
comparative criminology" (Miyazawa 1997).  
 
Considered broadly, Pontell and Geis's investigation reveals that Japanese social 
patterns regarding white-collar crime appear similar in many respects to those 
found in the United States. Yet, the characteristics and regulation of white-collar 
and corporate crime have spawned an extensive research literature in the United 
States while the subject has produced only a slight amount of scholarly work in 
Japan despite the apparent widespread corruption, financial fraud, and corporate 
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illegality that have caught the attention of the Japanese media.    
 
Two sets of factors could account for this state of apparent scholarly neglect of 
‘white collar’ crime in Japan. The first is legal.  As David Johnson (2003) points 
out, laws directed at powerful people and organizations are weaker in Japan than 
in the United States. Laws concerning corporate criminal liability are much more 
restrictive in the former than in the latter. The major distinction between the laws 
defining corporate criminal liability in the United States and those in Japan is that 
Japanese corporations cannot solely be criminally liable except when a member of 
the firm is convicted for an offense carried out on the company’s behalf.  As such, 
the infrequent discovery and criminal labeling of white-collar crime in the U.S. 
may well be more institutionalized in Japan as witnessed in the weak official law 
enforcement response to the banking scandals in the 1980s. The second factor is 
the cultural context in which white-collar crime takes place. Elements of Japanese 
culture, including timidity in the face of authority have been responsible for the 
general neglect of white-collar offenses. Here, the Komiya's (1999) concepts of 
uchi and yoso which refer to inner and outer personalized worlds might be useful 
to understand the Japanese toleration of corruption and more lenient treatment of 
white-collar and corporate criminals.  This toleration has not extended to the 
involvement of boroyokudan and new laws in 1992 and in 1999 have created a 
more hostile environment for yakuza (Hill 2006). 
 
Organized Crime and Gangs 
 
Three articles deal with what has been documented and studied extensively for the 
last five decades or so as traditional forms of organised crimes, with reference to 
drug syndicates and criminal gangs. In the first, Vincenzo Ruggiero and Kazim 
Khan (previous issue) examine the structure and modus operandi of the 
organisation of drug supply in British South Asian communities (BSA) as the 
demand for illicit drugs among BSA communities has grown along with concerns 
around the development of organized forms of criminality within those 
communities.  Based on their extensive review of existing definitions of organized 
crime, the authors contend that it might be more helpful to conceptualize 
organized crime as essentially a social organisation, either as a network of 
relations among individuals who form a culturally homogeneous group, or as a 
series of transactions among individuals in a common activity, whether or not they 
are socially and culturally homogeneous.  While the study underscored the 
importance of membership amalgamation through ethnicity, and cultural and 
geographic proximity, market dynamics may still overshadow the ethnic 
component.  The study revealed an important irony in that while users and small 
dealers were often engaged in the strenuous affirmation of ethnic identity those 
above them conducted business in total multi-ethnic harmony. Large importation 
operations, as the authors noted, are likely to involve multi-ethnic partnerships, 
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thus correcting the existing (prejudiced) official view that South Asians are in the 
business of importing drugs leveraging on their mono-ethnic networks. This 
official recognition has also led the police to increasingly perceive such 
communities as sources of criminal activity, disorder, and above all as enclaves of 
dangerous ‘Islamization’ (Webster, 2004). Police practices inspired by stereotypes 
and other forms of institutional racism are also reproduced at the transnational 
level, where certain visible minorities and some specific trafficking routes are 
unequally targeted through national and transnational law enforcement efforts.  
 
Recognizing the absence of a universally accepted definition of gangs in the 
literature, Hua-Lun Huang (previous issue), proposed a comprehensive typology 
based on the defining characteristics of gangs. He notes that in the past four 
decades, theories of gang activities have suffered from two fundamental 
weaknesses.  First, modern typologies on gangs imply that the boundary between 
different forms of ‘gangs’ is clear.  For example, based upon the basic features of 
delinquent subcultures, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) claimed that gangs could be 
divided into three categories: criminal, conflict, and retreatist.  As a result, nearly 
all of these typologies entail the hypothesis that gangs of a certain type are totally 
(or almost entirely) different from those of another. Such an argument is dubious 
because gangs usually differ in the extent/frequency of delinquency involvement, 
instead of a reified structure. Second, besides mutual exclusion, scholars who have 
proposed gang typologies tended to use only one factor (such as gang activity, 
social position, or organizational complexity) to differentiate between gangs. An 
important example would be Knox's (2000) gang typology where he suggested 
that gangs can be differentiated by the variable of organizational development 
alone. Huang objects to such classification typologies and argues that differences 
between gangs are relative, not absolute. Using different combinations of three 
factors of political belief, organizational layout, and political connection, a 
nomenclature for Asian gangs is suggested. Each of these factors can be divided 
into two different components: salient/inconspicuous ideology for political belief, 
tiered/egalitarian organizational arrangements for organizational layout, and 
patron-client /no patron-client relationships for political connection.  Asian gangs, 
as Huang notes, can be conceptually categorized into eight types.  These variations 
can help gang researchers explore questions like why certain gangs, under the 
interaction (or collective effects) of salient ideology, hierarchical structure, and 
political support, find it easier to recruit members, control more material 
resources, and enjoy longer life spans than other gangs.  A prospective application 
of the typology, stripped of some of the so-called origins of the gangs described by 
Huang, remains to be done. 
 
Internet, ‘new crimes’ and globalization 
 
Articles by Peter Grabosky (previous issue), and Russell Smith and Raymond 
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Choo (this issue) shift the focus from traditional organized crimes to the organized 
criminal exploitation of digital technology.  Developments in technology have 
been responsible for the dramatic transformation of organizational life in the last 
decade as much as they have also ‘created’ new organized criminals and new 
criminal organizations. There seems little doubt that all organizations, legitimate 
and criminal, will depend increasingly on digital technology for their continued 
existence.  Grabosky, explores the exploitation of digital technology in 
furtherance of organized crime as it becomes increasingly pervasive in altering 
traditional organizational forms. He identifies three dimensions of cybercrime: 
computers as the instrument of crime; computers as the target of criminal activity; 
and computers as incidental to ordinary crime. The various types of cybercrime 
include electronic piracy, counterfeiting and forgery, credit card fraud, child 
pornography, money-laundering, terrorist organizations and cyberspace.  
Grabosky contends that there are at least three ways to distinguish between forms 
of criminal organizations in cyberspace: first, traditional criminal organizations 
such as triad societies that use digital technology in furtherance of their traditional 
practices; second, organizations that have come into existence into cyberspace and 
whose organizational activities occur almost exclusively in the on-line 
environment; third, organizations that exist for otherwise legitimate purposes, but 
which become corrupted; and finally,  the more ephemeral organizations that exist 
only briefly in the virtual world and then disperse. 
 
Raymond Choo and Russell Smith, note that with the ease of accessing and 
sharing content electronically, the key issue to consider is whether crime follows 
opportunity, particularly with the criminal exploitation of online auctions, 
payment systems, gaming, social networking sites and blogs.  In addition to the 
categories of criminal organizations (and their motivations) that operate in 
cyberspace as identified by Grabosky, Choo and Smith have also identified yet 
another form of cyber groups which are organized ideologically and politically.  
Prior to 9-11, terrorism and organized crime were usually considered separate 
entities because they did not share the same motivating factor (e.g. making a 
political statement versus profit). However, in recent years, as the authors argue, 
there has been a noted convergence between terrorism and organized crime where 
criminal organizations can become ideologically driven overtime and acquire 
political and religious predispositions. The authors also point out that  organized 
ideologically-motivated cyber groups (including terrorist groups) could, 
potentially, use online chat rooms and social networking sites such as Friendster, 
Facebook, MySpace and Jihad-oriented forums, as vehicles to reach an 
international audience, solicit funding, recruit members and distribute propaganda. 
It has also been noted in recent months that individuals sympathetic to terrorists' 
cause are hooking onto the internet to engage in what has been described as ‘self-
radicalisation’. This newly emerging phenomenon is of concern to the authorities 
in countries like Singapore.  
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Mark Findlay commences his analysis with a discussion of terrorism as one of the 
contemporary forms of organized crime in the context of globalization.  While 
organized crime has had been historically represented as a 'menace' attacking the 
integrity of the democratic state and its institutions, terrorism has become to be 
seen more of a threat to global governance and trade.   Essential in both 
globalization and globalized crime is the internalization of capital, the 
generalization of consumerism, deregulation and the unification of economies. 
Where states are stronger and legitimate markets more resilient, capital generated 
through organized crime may support terrorism as it works to undermine state 
forms which in turn will create unstable market conditions in which organized 
crime will further flourish. The globalization of crime represents the potential to 
view many crime relationships unburdened by conventional legal and moral 
regulation. According to Waters (1995: 57-58), “…spatial barriers have collapsed 
so that the world is now a single field within which capitalism can operate, and 
capital flows become more and more sensitive to the relative advantages of 
particular spatial locations”. Yet, in examining the nexus between organized 
crime, terrorism and globalization, Findlay identifies the problem of finding 
sufficient persuasive evidence beyond operational ‘intelligence’ to confirm 
organized crime as the major source of terrorist funding. This leads to the insight 
that any commonality between organized crime and terrorism is likely to be 
confined to the level of enterprise (as distinct from any shared ideologies).  The 
link between crime and terror is often no more than circumstantial, however, 
terrorist groups may have little restraint in using crime to raise the necessary funds 
need to support their goals.   
 
In view of the lack of scientific ‘evidence’ linking the two social phenomena, it is 
time to stimulate empirical research on organized crime and terrorism both within 
and beyond the region.  Without a sound evidence-based research program the 
capacity not only to foster more advanced discussions on specific policy measures, 
but also to expand criminology’s empirical and theoretical domain is greatly 
hampered. As noted by Kleeman (2008), such research has the potential to enrich 
traditional criminology on issues such as criminal careers, co-offending, ethnicity 
and crime, and a ‘situational’ analysis of the various crime phenomena.    
 
Counter-measures 
 
Nicholas Dorn and Michael Levi (this issue) draw on reports from international 
and regional bodies, and from both academic and operational sources to critically 
assess the anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist finance (ATF) policies 
in Asian and European countries. Their comparative account of organized crime 
by takes into account the different nuances in Asian and European policy practices 
regarding illegal timber logging, 'informal' transfers and security, and terrorism.  
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The focus here is on how differing policy emphases - the Asians on economic and 
financial issues while the Europeans on political dialogue relating to issues of 
security and values - may serve as technical barriers to improved international 
cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing.  It is precisely the 
problem of emphasis that Margaret Lewis (previous issue) documents in the 
context of China's response to transnational organized crime. While China's 
domestic laws are substantially in compliance with the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime's (UNTOC) requirements, she notes that 
its legal reforms since signing the UNTOC are not driven solely by a fear of 
organized crime, let alone transnational organized crime.  There are ample 
concerns about the reach of organized crime within the PRC and the role of 
foreign crime syndicates (Xia, 2006). However, China’s legislative reforms are 
better understood in the light of the government’s more pressing goal of 
combating financial crime, both domestic and transnational, whether or not 
organized.  Lewis also stresses that China’s engagement with the problem of 
transnational organized crime is not only motivated by enlightened self-interest 
but real concerns it has about its internal security and threats from “separatists”. 
However, this is not to say that the aforementioned authors have ignored the 
nuances of the various types of organized crimes. Rather, they emphasize the need 
to consider current efforts at the international, institutional, political and economic 
levels when comparing organized crime in different geographical regions.  
 
Rebecca La Forgia and Marinella Marmo (this issue) take up one crucial aspect of 
the problem of countering the harsher forms of transnational organized crime – 
women trafficked or ‘traded’ for the sex industry.  In doing so they bring us back 
to one of the fundamental reasons that organized crime, criminal enterprise and 
violent gangs persist: they thrive on the prohibition of pleasure and the attempts by 
law to promote morality.  By exploiting illicit consumers and sex workers the sex 
industry attracts organized criminals and corrupts officials. A major concern for 
La Forgia and Marmo is the lack of rights, indeed the re-victimization accorded to 
Asian and other trafficked women who end up in the ‘safe’ hands of the law. In 
one sense the legal system consumes them as moral ambiguous actors in a 
functionalist drama. In their article they look at the response of a typical 
destination country for Asian women trafficked for sex – Australia. Here the 
demand side of the business of selling sex may be one where reasonable 
safeguards might be expected. Demand itself, in their view, needs to be addressed 
– with demand reduction there would be less harm. However, the commodification 
of women as sex objects does not render the business or ‘trade” status any less 
subject to the compulsory ‘protection’ and violence associated with shady 
enterprises such as the organized sex industry’s incessant demand for new flesh. 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, the efforts of the Australian authorities in both 
recognizing the reality for trafficked women and addressing the consequences for 
them have been weak. These authors touch upon the apparent smugness or 
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“otherness” accorded to exotic victims of the sex trade by the public as ‘voyeur’ 
and they draw little comfort from the apparent window dressing associated with 
the signing of international agreements to end the worse aspects of these forms of 
modern slavery.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The articles contained in this special issue deal with a wide range of 
methodological, conceptual and theoretical issues of organized crime in Asia and 
in the broader Asia-Pacific region.  A crucial problem remains the limited range of 
empirical research on organized crime. The continued absence of a world class 
centre in Asia for the study of crime and the lack any serious multi-national 
support for comparative (or even national) studies drawing upon the many 
disciplines (e.g. criminology, economics, political science, anthropology) that can 
shed light on the problems of criminal enterprises is a serious deficiency.   
 
As much as the authors seek to locate organized crime in the social, political, 
economic and cultural diversities of the region, they also signal a need to stimulate 
further research on the phenomenon as the region experiences dramatic economic, 
political and social changes. A large dose of the skeptical and reflective is also 
necessary when dealing with the complex relationships and political economies 
that arise from the darker side of capitalism. With the rise of the new economic 
giants China and India, there is little doubt that the landscape of organized crime 
will change for the worse. In Asia potentially devastating diversions from 
traditional security concerns such as avian influenza, HIV infection, climate 
disasters coupled with continuing high levels of poverty (despite impressive gains 
by some countries) and environmental degradation can readily occupy hard-
pressed agencies. In these circumstances maintaining hard won gains against 
trafficking (drugs, persons, and arms), economic and environmental crime, money 
laundering, sea piracy and cybercrime may be easily jeopardized. The implications 
for the region and beyond could become much graver and readers need not be 
reminded of the terrible costs that rampant criminal enterprise may impose upon 
individuals and civil society.  It is hoped that this special issue is one step towards 
the empirical documentation and scholarly engagement with the problems and 
challenges posed by organized crime in Asia.        
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